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case. IGC failed to do so. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying IGC's petition for writ of error coram
nobis and motion to vacate the consent decree.
Gloria M. Soto
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
individuals rightfully possessing prior property interests in lakes, now
held in public trust, own the submerged land beneath the lake and the
air above, to the low water mark point, as measured at the time the
lake transferred into public trust).
Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton ("Hamilton") filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against the
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, its executive director, and
several employees in their official and individual capacities ("TWRA").
Hamilton sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the TWRA,
and compensatory and punitive damages against the employees, in
their individual capacities. Hamilton alleged that TWRA and its
employees violated Hamilton's due process rights by unlawfully
searching and seizing Hamilton's boat, duck blind, and decoys from
Reelfoot Lake at the orders of the TWRA regional office. Additionally,
Hamilton sought declaratory relief pronouncing that Hamilton owned
a property interest in Reelfoot Lake. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of TWRA, finding sovereign immunity
barred Hamilton's claims, and that in the alternative, Hamilton did
not own a property interest in Reelfoot Lake because the lake was held
in public trust. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
that the employees in their individual capacities were immune from
suit because the employees' actions were reasonable and protected as a
discretionary function. However, the court reversed the district court's
judgment on the other claims. It held that Hamilton owned a
property interest in Reelfoot Lake under Tennessee law, and
remanded the case to determine whether the Hamiltons had standing
to enforce their property rights, and to resolve disputed issues
regarding the measurement of the property interest.
In 1788, the State of North Carolina granted Colonel Doherty,
Hamilton's predecessor in interest, a deed of real property. In 1810,
an earthquake caused the formation of Reelfoot Lake, thus
submerging part of the land included under the original 1788 grant.
Hamilton's deed extended to the ordinary low water mark of Reelfoot
Lake. Since the Doherty grant included the entire portion of land
described in the original 1788 deed, Hamilton asserted Doherty's
riparian rights over the lakebed, 200 yards past the shore of the Lake,
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and argued that this territory was outside the TWRA's management.
Hamilton marked this 200-yard territory by a light pole, and often
moored a boat to the pole for hunting purposes. On November 16,
1996, Hamilton moored a camouflaged boat, duck blind, and duck
decoys to the light pole. TWRA officers were on duty searching for
unregistered blinds, including blinds erected under asserted riparian
ownership. The TWRA officers inspected Hamilton's boat and blind,
and did not find a registration tag. Reporting the boat and blind to
their supervisors, the TWRA regional office ordered removal of the
boat and blind. The employers removed the items found at the pole
from the lake. Subsequent to removal of the items, TWRA discovered
registration numbers on the boat. The TWRA denied Hamilton's
requests for immediate return of the items, yet they returned them ten
days later.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether
sovereign immunity barred Hamilton's claims. The district court ruled
the claims were barred because the effect of Hamilton's claims of
ownership in a lake held in public trust would effectively shift control
and all benefits of that part of the lake to Hamilton. The district court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, which ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe could
not assert a riparian property interest over an entire lake because it
effected Idaho's sovereignty. The court of appeals reversed the district
court and distinguished Idaho, holding that an individual possessing a
prior deed for land submerged under a lake may acquire riparian
rights over the water, above the land and obtain complete ownership
of the portion of a lake, provided the state retains ownership over part
of the lake. The court reasoned that because Hamilton was only
asserting control and ownership 200 yards off shore, the property
interest was not so broad that it would strip Tennessee of control over
Reelfoot Lake. Therefore, the TWRA was not immune from suit
because Hamilton asserted damages would not infringe upon
Tennessee's sovereignty.
The court of appeals then applied Tennessee state law to
determine whether Hamilton owned a riparian right in the lake. The
court held that individual property rights in Reelfoot Lake had already
been established in State ex. rel. Cates. In that case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the public trust in the lake was only
applicable to the lakebed, waters, and air outside of the grants issued
to Doherty in 1788. Applying this precedent, the court determined
that Hamilton had standing to bring suit and enforce their property
rights established in the Doherty grant if the boundaries of Hamilton's
asserted property interest was reasonably identifiable. The court
examined Hamilton's deed and found that the property interest
extended to the ordinary low water mark of the lake. Consequently, it
found that the boundaries of the deed were reasonably identifiable
because the land conveyed by the deed was not completely submerged
currently, or at the time the lake was conveyed into public trust.
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Because the lands could be identified, the court held that Hamilton
owned the submerged lands below the low water mark at the time the
lake was conveyed into public trust in 1913. The court of appeals then
remanded this issue to the district court to determine the level of the
low water mark in 1913.
Holly Shook

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
Missouri Soybean Association's claims of potential harm to its
members resulting from the Environmental Protection Agency's
stricter controls of the use of challenged waters in Missouri because
the claims were too remote and speculative).
Plaintiff, Missouri Soybean Association ("MSA") sued the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's list of
pollution-impaired waters because some of the waters included lacked
documentation of pollution. MSA's complaint focused on potential
harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the use of the
challenged waters. The court consolidated MSA's suit with the Sierra
Club, Ozark Chapter's and the American Canoe Association, Inc.'s
("environmental plaintiffs") earlier lawsuit also challenging the EPA's
approval of Missouri's 1998 list claiming such list was under inclusive.
The EPA and the environmental plaintiffs settled their dispute
through a consent decree approved by the district court.
MSA moved for partial summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The EPA filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming MSA lacked standing and ripeness, and, in the
alternative, moving for summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The court assumed MSA had
standing, but found MSA's suit was not ripe for adjudication. Thus, it
denied MSA's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the EPA, dismissing MSA's suit
with prejudice. MSA's appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
States compile lists of impaired by, first, pursuant to the CWA,
identifying and prioritizing those waters within its boundaries that do
not meet the its water quality standards. Next, states submit the list of
impaired waters, known as the section 303(d) list, to the EPA for
approval. Finally, once the EPA approves the list, the impaired waters
undergo scientific study to establish the total maximum daily load

